On the international level, during 1988, two events changed the military and political situation to the detriment of the Mujahideen: the mysterious “ plane crash ” of August 17, in which Pakistani president Zia-ul-Haq was killed, and the election to the American presidency of G. Bush, with a less ideological attitude than Reagan. While on the American side the aid was considered less relevant, after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the Soviet ones were strengthened with an annual expenditure of three billion dollars, compared to 600 million US dollars. Long-range SCUD missiles (up to 600 km) were also supplied to Kābul.
With the plan of recognition of the tribes militias were formed in favor of the regime; it is estimated that the armed forces including the army, police, WAD (ex- Khad) and tribal militias reached 127,000 units, equal to the number of the various resistance forces. On the military level, the positions held by the two sides did not substantially change. Some military leaders emerged as prominent figures; in Panjshir a local government was formed under the leadership of Shah Masud, affiliated with Jamiat Islamī. Elsewhere, I. Khan (Herāt area), Afghanistan Haq (Kābul area) and Afghanistan Haqani (Paktia) stood out. Relations between the commanders of the interior, the Peshawar alliance and that of Meshed were discontinuous; the ties for the fundamentalist formations seemed to be closer. After the last Soviet troops left the Afghanistan (April 14, 1989), TASS officially recognized the loss of 13,833 men, while by the resistance the number was at least doubled. In Peshawar a Shura (assembly) of all the members of the Mujahidı · n was convened ; the Shiite elements did not participate, disagreeing on the numerical size of their representatives. For Afghanistan 2011, please check internetsailors.com.
After the first elections following the death of Zia, the government of B. Bhutto obtained a majority in the Pakistani Parliament; in Iran, Khomeini was followed by a new, more pragmatic leadership. The Pakistani armed forces and the ISI were tightening the pace: they wanted a military success of the Mujahidīn and in particular the capture of Gialālābād, near the famous pass of Khyber. The result was a blatant failure, if not defeat, and as such it was touted by the Kabul regime.
On 10 March 1989 the interim government of the Alliance met at Khosht, in Afghan territory, for the composition of the new government elected by the Shura: S. Mujaddidi was elected president, and Afghanistan Sayyaf prime minister. All the other leaders of the Alliance participated as ministers, with the exception of Gailani. After clashes between rival factions, Hekmatyar also withdrew from the government. A coup (March 7, 1990), led by the army chief of staff S. Tanai, of the khalqi faction, was defeated by forces loyal to Najibullah. The coup attempt seemed to indicate a possible alliance between the fundamentalist forces of Hekmatyar and the Leninist-nationalist forces of the Khalq, on the basis of a common convenience in destroying the traditional elements of Afghan society. During 1990 a liberalization process was initiated which should lead to the birth of a multi-party system. The PDPA took the name of the Party of the Fatherland (Hezb-i-Watan) – in its second congress in June 1990 – and the reference to its leadership role was removed from the Constitution. In the autumn, Najibullah initiated contacts with opposition figures in an attempt to agree on a ” political solution ” that would put an end to the civil war.
The situation that seems to be looming for many refugees is that of integration into the structures of Pakistan, even if this process is hampered by the local government of the NWFP (North West Frontier Province), supported by the Pashtun leader Wali Khan on pro-Soviet positions. The policy of an independent Pashtunistan and an independent Baluchistan is endorsed by the Kābul regime. THERE. culturally, socially and politically historical has been largely destroyed. The main ideologies (even if for now not in the majority) seem to be the homogenizing ones of the Fundamentalists on the one hand, and those that underline linguistic nationalisms on a communist basis on the other. On the social level, the balance of the population has been altered, so much so that today theA term often used to designate ethnically and culturally diversified Dari (Persian) language groups, but mostly Sunni, it prevails over the Pashtun one. The Afghan mosaic seems irretrievably broken up by the breakdown of the traditional mix of sedentary and nomadic groups, Sunni and Shia, mullahs and pirs, tribal and non-tribal, city and countryside, without established linguistic borders. The umma, on the other hand, while unifying the Afghan populations in the name of Islam, left ample space for the code of honor, the Pashtunwali, and to the various brotherhoods who found adepts from all linguistic and cultural groups. From an economic point of view, although the operations of the pipeline have been interrupted, the industrial, energy and communication structures remain linked to the Soviet territory; it is certainly a mortgage on the future that cannot be underestimated, also because it tended to detach the North of the Afghanistan from other regions, underlining the ” Turkish ” linguistic aspect. A decisive step in this direction was recorded in September 1991 with the agreement between the USSR and the USA for the suspension of military supplies to both parties. On the international level, the resistance has not managed to meet sufficient support groups due to poor ideologization and for having maintained a local profile.